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Professor Wein makes an interesting suggestion in this paper. It happens to be one to which
I am supportive as I have periodically used Decision Theory in my own Critical Thinking
courses. From my own experience, I have found students to benefit from exposure to decision
theoretical techniques, especially given that these techniques are widely used in the various
disciplines from which our students tend to come. This is a point I share with Wein, as we will
see. The tease at the beginning of the paper, however, would have surely raised a few eyebrows.
And it is unfortunate that Wein does not follow-up on his inclination that "the time devoted to
decision theory ought to be greater than that devoted to such matters as argument evaluation or
fallacy recognition."
Wein's argument, I take it, offers a number of reasons for the instructor of an introductory
logic course/critical thinking course to incorporate substantially decision theory:
1) Decision theory aids in understanding differences between intrinsic and
instrumental values.
2) The concept of maximizing expected utility is useful.
3) Game theoretic problems are more like what the student needs or will be exposed
to later on.
Wein claims this last reason also ties in nicely with student interests. Indeed, the Prisoner's
Dilemma pops up in a number of disciplines, as does the Tragedy of the Commons. Students do
tend to take an interest in these. That students take an interest in these topics ought not to be the
fuel that drives us to teach decision theory in introduction to logic courses. (I will give Wein a
fair bit of latitude here: at a number of institutions an introductory logic course is far from the
type of course many of us here would suggest as a critical thinking course. That is another
debate for another session.)
Wein's strategy in this paper is to clarify what he calls a "fairly neutral interpretation" of
introductory logic courses. Presuming that we accept this interpretation – an interpretation that
broadly and idealistically informs the reader of the goals of such courses – we are led down a
path that is supposed to show how decision theory fits in nicely within logic courses, whether
informal or formal. Logic, on Wein's account, can be normatively construed. That is, under
varying circumstances, the agent will be able to consider what she OUGHT to believe. Decision
theory, of course, picks up from here and offers the agent the tools to determine what she
OUGHT to do. On the formal side, Wein points out the degree of rigour to which decision
theory has been developed. This he claims should appease the formalist among us. But this is
hardly the point for formalism. For the formalist, the rigour is a result of adopting a formalist
position and not the other way around.
For the informal logician, Wein claims nothing is different, and although we are here at this
conference attesting to the fact that argumentation theory has "come a long way." Nonetheless,
although decision theory has "analogously" come a long way, I am sure that many informal
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logicians will want to be "rationally persuaded" or examine the "warrant" in adopting decision
theory in their courses.
The point about rigour aside, Wein's principal point for adopting decision theory is that
"most of our students are less interested in what one should believe than they are in what one
should do." Students aren't academics, for whom what one ought to believe truly matters. Wein
concedes that we should not simply "pander to the present interests of our students" and so the
task left is to show that decision theoretic skills help shape the very same skills acquired in
becoming a critical thinker. In fact "learning to be a rational decision-maker is likely to enhance
one's other critical thinking capacities more than learning to be a critical thinker is likely to
enhance a student's ability to make rational decisions." That is, the extra-decision theoretic
benefits outweigh the extra-critical thinking benefits. This is an incredible claim to make and
one for which I would like more clarification. Either there is some empirical evidence for this or
there must be a strong "argument" showing that the sorts of things taught in argument analysis
are ultimately reduced to decision theory. Neither of these is proposed and, in the end, Wein's
paper, as well as the reader, would benefit from this. Further, the distinction, if there is one,
between believing and doing, as goals for students, will need to be bridged.
Let me re-iterate that I am quite sympathetic to Wein's suggestion. Science, social science,
business, nursing, and engineering students can all benefit from learning decision theory. And I
suppose that the majority of our students come from one of these disciplines. However, decision
theory is often taught in math, business and/or economics programs. What has Wein offered
here that should persuade us to attempt to convince typically philosophy chairs that we ought to
include decision theory in critical thinking courses? The answer to this question has been hinted
in the paper but hasn't been explicitly answered. If the appeal to decision theory is, as Wein
claims, that it accomplishes much of the same things as critical thinking, then why alter our
courses? Surely it can't just be because a number of fascinating topics arise (and they do), for an
imaginative critical thinking instructor should be able to come up with equally fascinating topics.
In conclusion, Wein's topic is worthy of exploration. He has embarked on a discussion that
is philosophically and logically relevant. Nonetheless, it would be helpful to see just how
introductory decision theory can be used and examples could have been brought in to show their
relevance, as well as their interest factor for both students and instructors. Recall that Wein is
urging us to do something, namely to adopt decision theory in introductory courses. On his own
analysis then, a decision theoretic analysis should convince us of doing so.

